Negotiating Our Future

UOG President Robert Underwood gave an interesting quote on the military buildup in the new mini-documentary Manhita: Building our Future Together, produced by the Guam News Factor. He stated that at present in terms of our posture towards this buildup, we on Guam are articulating what we deserve, but that’s not enough (or not helpful). In business you never get what you deserve, you get what you negotiate. The lesson of his statement is that in all things, whether it be war reparations, the military buildup or land return, you don’t get much or anything by simply arguing that you deserve it or its owed to you. You have to negotiate, demand, compel or force it somehow. Abstractly that makes perfect sense, and I agree with that on the surface.

Underwood is absolutely correct for instance in terms of the military buildup that’s hitting Guam. The Government of Guam is the key negotiator that Guam has, and for years (with a few small exceptions) did nothing but pray for the best, and simply hope that the large dollar sums which were being waved around would somehow end up in the Government’s general fund. Olaha mohon na ayu na puma’ya’ya’ na biyonyon na salape’ para Hita!

Over the past year or so The Legislature and the Governor’s office have largely been split on almost everything dealing with the military buildup. The Governor who is the island’s “sovereign” or chief executive and thus is the main person that the Department of Defense or the Federal Government deal with. The Legislature on the other hand is feeling the impact of the DOD’s disdain for democracy in the real world, and often has to struggle to get information or be included in the loop. This difference between which group is inside and which is outside has contributed to the Governor being largely passive on Federal/Territorial issues, whereas the Legislature has been more aggressive.

But what all of this has amounted to is that fact that the Government of Guam continues to operate primarily on some minor scathing rhetoric (we aren’t being respected or included in the process again) and a truck load full of optimism and dreamy hope. In terms of negotiating, this is a terrible position to be in. Both of these tactics are built more on a wish for the way things would be, than an actual understanding of how things are. In both of these you aren’t really acknowledging where you have power or where you don’t have power, and simply hoping that you or your problems, issues or anger will be recognized.

But one crucial missing piece of Underwood’s comment, is one of the reasons why the Government of Guam is in tatters over what to do about the military buildup, and that’s the colonial question of, how are you supposed to negotiate when you don’t have a position to negotiate from?

Its important to remind everyone whenever we can, that when this military “transfer” was negotiated, Guam wasn’t at the table with representatives of Japan and the United States. Manaigue hit. You could argue that since the US controls Guam it can do whatever it wants with and when it negotiates Guam is included, or automatically represented. That sort of interpretation however is generally invested in covering over colonialism or is built upon “hope” and “love.”

Its only meaningful if we believe in the long-standing colonial mantra that “what’s good for America is good for Guam.” There are moments when you can believe it, when it might be true, there are moments when its not, but ultimately the political status makes the goodness or the badness of it irrelevant, since Guam is not an equal or secure partner in the way it “belongs” to the United States. Whether or not something applies to it, or whether or not Guam is represented by the United States is not an automatic yes or no, but always something which the colonizer gets to decide.

Guam’s predicament is that its lack of power is part of its value to the United States military. If Guam did have some sort of existing position to negotiate from, then it might not have been chosen to be the site for the transfer of forces from Okinawa (although strategic location most likely would have overriden this). That was one of the concerns in 2001 when the Department of Defense was looking for a site to “house” the enemy combatants that it had captured in Afghanistan. Guam was put on a list along with other potential sites, but it was quickly crossed off, since Guam, while not really being American, was nonetheless too “legally” American, and that might interfere with the creation of the legal black hole the Bush Administration wanted.

So although Underwood’s comment is overly simplistic, he’s not wrong, he’s absolutely right. If Guam needs to negotiate but has no place to negotiate, then what is our plan? What is our strategy for getting what we need? How are we going to build that sovereign space from which we won’t be taken advantage of and also from which we won’t just simply beg or pray for Uncle Sam’s help and salape anymore?

There are always two ways in which a community can respond to a crisis, the first is to cling to the ways things are and just pray that all will be okay. The second is to try something different. Even if it seems radical, crazy or impossible, a period of difficulty can be the best incentive to try something else, to work to free yourself from dependency or work to build your own sustainability. As Guam faces this military buildup and the possible benefits, changes and damages that it will bring to Guam, which path do you think we should take?